Explaining governance failure: accountability spaces in-between and bias by Marnet, Oliver
1 
 
Explaining governance failure: accountability spaces in-between 
and bias. 
 
Accepted for publication by the International Journal of Critical Accounting (August 
2012) 
 
Oliver Marnet 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper is based on a two-year participant observer study of the governance 
failures in a UK housing association that experienced significant adverse 
performance resulting in its near collapse.  Concerned with the accountability of 
boards of directors, the study extends research by Roberts (1991, 1996, 2001) who 
distinguishes between formal and informal forms of accountability, and Collier (2005) 
who identifies accountability spaces in-between where governance may be lost. The 
present research builds on this discussion by introducing socio-psychological factors 
underlying a reluctance of boards to adequately explore governance issues hidden in 
these spaces. As informal reporting systems are increasingly important drivers of the 
control role of boards (Parker, 2008), the paper emphasizes the need for boards to 
adopt procedures aimed at mitigating the effects of bias on the quality of board 
decision-making. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper explores limitations of formal, accounting-based systems of accountability 
and inadequacies of informal, sense-making narrative systems (Roberts, 1991, 1996, 
2001; Collier, 2005).  The sense-making narrative terminology builds on the contrast 
made by Roberts (1991) between a formal, hierarchical system of accountability 
based on calculative accounting, and an informal, socialising form, which in 
boardroom discussions increasingly replaces the focus on the technical and rule-
based (Parker, 2008).  Hidden between the two systems, Collier (2005) identifies 
accountability spaces in-between where neither the formal nor the informal ensures 
that issues important to the organization are sufficiently explored and where 
governance can be neglected and lost.  The present research inquires into socio-
psychological causes for the reluctance of boards to investigate these spaces.  The 
paper suggests that cognitive bias in judgment frequently inhibits an adequate 
articulation and exploration of issues critical to the governance of organizations, 
thereby undermining the value of the narrative form of accountability (Langevoort, 
2001a,b; Prentice, 2003; Bazerman and Malhotra, 2006; Forbes and Watson, 2010; 
FRC, 2011; APB, 2012). 
 
With the rise of New Public Management (NPM) and the subsequent increase in the 
use of performance measurement in the quasi-public sector (Collier, 2005; Bogt and 
Scapens, 2012), a discussion on bias in the boardroom provides useful insights on 
potential problems and dysfunctional consequences of the adoption of this model in 
the public sector (see, e.g., Hood, 2007; McLean et al., 2007; Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008; Lapsley, 2008).  New Public Management, although changing over time and 
from country to country, stresses the use of explicit quantitative performance 
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measures and external audits, output controls, and private sector management 
methods to advance public sector performance and accountability (Hood, 1995, 
2007; Pollitt, 2006; de Bruijn, 2007; Woods, 2010; Bogt and Scapens, 2012). A 
reliance by boards on quantitative performance measures as expressions of formal 
accountability may, however, not be warranted when bias in the boardroom leads to 
the failure of the narrative to provide a counterbalance to managerial discretion over 
these measures. 
 
The case study serves to illustrate the impact of bias on the quality of a board’s 
decision-making (FRC, 2011; APB; 2012). The two-year participant observer study, 
with the researcher as a full member of the board, analyzes board interfaces with 
executive management of a UK housing association (subsequently referred to as 
‘the Association’), with a focus on the role of accountability in the processes of 
governance before, during, and after a crisis of confidence and subsequent 
restructuring. The Association suffered a rapid transition from a successful 
organization to one which experienced near fatal failures in financial and operational 
management.  Central to this transformation was the board’s loss of control over the 
organization when it neglected to explore issues that had been hiding in the spaces 
identified by Collier (2005).   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The second section outlines the context of the 
study and explores the theoretical concepts introduced above. The third section 
describes elements of the field study.  Building on the notions of calculative and 
narrative accounting (Roberts, 1991; Collier, 2005), the fourth section links the case 
to the theoretical framework, and discusses cognitive bias as a factor which affects 
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board effectiveness by inhibiting an adequate exploration of accountability spaces in-
between.  The final section presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Context of the study 
Corporate governance has been defined as “the system by which organizations are 
directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992), and as being “concerned with structures 
and processes for decision-making, accountability, control and behavior at the top of 
organizations” (IFAC, 2001, p.1).  Although primarily focused on the private sector, 
the governance paradigm developed in the UK over the past two decades (Gwilliam 
and Marnet, 2010) applies to housing associations with their general adoption of the 
Cadbury Code of Best Practice (Cadbury, 1992), and broad adherence to 
recommendations of subsequent reviews and guidelines of the UK governance 
framework with regard to external audit and the responsibilities of the board. 
 
Housing associations construct and manage housing for groups on low incomes or 
with support needs, and have an increasing role in the provision of social housing in 
the UK after the significant downsizing and outsourcing of public-sector involvement 
since the late 1980s. Over the past two decades, these organizations have moved 
from mainly small scale complementary roles to the large scale delivery of public 
services, and are the predominant vehicle for the delivery of affordable housing 
(Wilcox, 2004; Mullins, 2010).  By 2009, housing associations in England owned 
some 2.4 million rental units (either purpose built, or acquired through stock transfer 
from local councils), 95 per cent of which used for social housing (Tang, 2010).  
Substantial initial funding, and much of the continuing funding flow, is provided 
through public sector capital grants and housing benefits which form some 65 per 
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cent of the sector’s rent income (Collier, 2005; Mullins, 2010; Tang, 2010).  
Additional funds are provided through private financial market loans, with lenders 
typically requiring a 30-year business plan outlining projected income and 
expenditure streams to ensure that cash flows cover the principal and interest 
payments (TSA, 2012; Community Housing, 2011).  The book value of the sector’s 
housing assets in England 2010/11 reached £109 billion (Wales and Scotland 
operate and regulate their own schemes), supported by £45 billion of private finance 
and some £40 billion grant (TSA, 2012).   
 
Social housing in the UK is subject to a high level of regulation and periodic 
audit/inspection, and mandatory financial reporting requirements are met through a 
system of formal accounting and external audit, as one component of accountability 
(Collier, 2005; TSA, 2012; Community Housing, 2011).  From 2002 onward, rent 
increases for housing associations in England have been capped by a guideline limit 
of the Retail Price Index (RPI) + 0.5% (DETR, 2001; TSA, 2012), with comparable 
constraints to rent increases in Scotland and Wales (Community Housing, 2011). 
Regardless of the not-for-profit orientation of such organizations, their boards must 
deal with issues of financial planning and control, regulatory and managerial 
oversight, governance, pension liabilities, and financial responsibilities for the assets 
under their control.  Their non-executive directors hold responsibilities, and face 
conflicts, similar to those of directors of listed companies, related to the setting of 
organizational objectives, monitoring of performance, scrutiny of financial reports, 
and the supervision of executive management (Brudney, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Daily et al., 1996; Ezzamel and Watson, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 
Higgs, 2003; Brennan, 2006).  These responsibilities are set in an environment of 
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multiple stakeholders with frequently opposing agendas and demands, which 
sharpens and complicates the contrast between a traditional sector focus on service 
provision and the need to manage short and long-term financial commitments 
(Collier, 2005; Mullins, 2010). 
 
A focus of New Public Management on quantitative measurability gives “primacy to 
accounting practices and processes” (Kurunmäki et al., 2011, p. 1), with key 
importance allocated to professional managers in the implementation of policies set 
for the public sector (Hood, 1995).  One consequence of this focus on professional 
managers is a concentration of discretional power over accounting practices and 
processes at the executive level.  The potential use of these discretional powers to 
influence what is expressed in formal accounts, in combination with inherent 
limitations to “the capability of accounting calculations to identify the absolute truth” 
(McSweeney, 1996, p. 217), suggests that formal accounts provide only partial and 
limited expressions of a board’s accountability (see Collier, 2005, for a discussion of 
these limits).  The narrative, then, as a driver of the exercise of control, necessarily 
shares and defines the discharge of a board’s responsibilities to its stakeholders 
(Parker, 2008). This resonates with interpretations that calculative forms of 
accountability cannot replace responsibilities of judgment and opinion which remain 
dependent on, and should find expressions in, narrative systems of accountability 
(Hoskin, 1996; Kamuf, 2007).  By adopting elements of a paradigmatic approach to 
good corporate governance in terms of an overall focus on appropriate internal 
control and risk management (see Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010), boards of quasi-
public sector organizations (Collier, 2005) face traps and pitfalls in implementation 
not dissimilar to those experienced by listed companies (FRC, 2011).  The following 
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analysis of the events at the Association demonstrates that the informal form of 
accountability is exposed to a number of bias inducing factors which can affect the 
quality of boardroom decision-making, with the potential to diminish the contribution 
of the narrative as a tool of board control (Forbes and Watson, 2010; Marnet, 2011; 
FRC, 2011; APB, 2012). 
 
3. Field study 
The participant-observer methodology enables first-hand insights into a number of 
issues which impact on a board’s willingness to explore accountability spaces.  
However, the need to preserve confidentiality constitutes a challenge for this 
approach with regard to the use of supportive evidence for observations and 
assertions where detailed substantiation would allow for the identification of the 
organization under investigation (Parker, 2008).  Despite this constraint, there are 
few substitutes for observations of actual board meetings by a researcher in 
developing an understanding of factors influencing board effectiveness (Heracleous, 
1999), and key weaknesses in the governance and control mechanisms of the 
Association can be identified to inform the discussion.  Basic facts and a chronology 
of key events are summarised at this point to support the subsequent analysis. 
3.1 Key facts 
Governance framework (prior to the re-organization):   
 Nominal adherence to Cadbury recommendations (Cadbury, 1992), 
supervised by sector regulator and subject to periodic inspections, 
responsibilities to diverse group of stakeholders. 
 Long acting CEO, Chair and external auditor.   
 Board composed of up to 15 non-executive directors: 8 (typically long-
acting) elected (and re-elected) by ‘shareholders’ at the Annual General 
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Meeting (upon approval by the board, interested parties can become 
members through payment of £1), 4 tenant members elected by tenants, 
and up to 3 co-opted members (not always filled).  
 CEO and CFO traditionally attending board meetings. 
Indicative chronology of events:   
Until 2003 Steady growth in revenue base (mainly housing units 
under management) and close matching of revenues 
with expenditures. Positive cash flows and creation of 
substantial cash reserves. 
From 2003 Increasing divergence between (near static) revenues 
and (rapidly rising) expenditures (mainly due to staff 
expansion and above sector average salaries).  Board 
largely unaware, while emerging concerns by individual 
directors remain largely unarticulated. The Association 
increasingly operates at a deficit. 
Early 2007 Cash reserves exhausted. 
Late 2007 Highly critical verdict by independent inspection report 
on the quality of service provision, which put in question 
the ability of the Association to remain independent, acts 
as catalyst for board action. 
Late 2007 to 
early 2009 
Significant restructuring and re-orientation of the 
Association (new CEO and CFO, emergency board 
meetings, away days, task and finish groups, meetings 
with stakeholders and regulator, replacement of external 
auditor, imposition of outside directors, etc.).   
Mid-2009 Association regains financial footing, and the trust of the 
regulators and financial sector stakeholders.  Resumes 
normal business operations. 
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Key Governance weaknesses: 
 Executive management team in place for a long time (issues for the board 
of familiarity, trust, complacency, confidence in prior performance vs. 
CEO). 
 Board in place for a long time (familiarity, socialisation, prior decisions). 
 External auditors in place for a long time (familiarity, loss of critical attitude, 
loss of independence, prior decisions).  
 Dominant chair and CEO who set the board agenda and controlled board 
meetings (lack of critical performance review, unwarranted trust, 
socialization, peer pressures).  
 Large board size (reliance on other members to raise issues, free rider 
issues, poor communication, unwarranted trust in senior members). 
 Limited direct contact between the board and external auditors (no direct 
communication, no voicing of critical issues by the auditor, no critical 
questions to the auditor). 
 Failure of executive management to recognise failures in service provision 
of the organization and to balance increased operating costs with near 
static revenues (a management failure, not queried by the board). 
 Critical information withheld from the board (a classic feature of almost all 
governance failures). 
 Financial presentations to the board lacking detail; data incomplete, late, 
inadequate (not forcefully questioned by board). 
 Weak internal audit function (very poor record keeping, lack of critical 
input to board meetings, inadequate, unreliable, untimely data not queried 
by the board).  
 Board members’ limited financial and accounting experience and limited 
training of board members (lack of expertise, failure to fully understand 
financial data, failure to realise limitations of financial data in the discharge 
of board responsibilities, little comprehension of roles, duties, and powers 
of board). 
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 Apprehensions of board members not voiced during board meetings 
(failure to explore spaces, loyalty bias, and socialization). 
 Failure of the board to accept the need for change prior to the devastating 
inspection report, and reluctance to support changes as a matter of 
urgency (preference of status quo, excessive loyalty to CEO, dissonance 
reduction). 
3.2 The Association 
The Association was established by the merger of two housing associations more 
than 15 years prior to the described events, and is governed by a board of 
management of 15 non-executive members, with minor variations in membership 
numbers and composition over time (mergers between housing associations reflect a 
trend, see Tang, 2010).  The CEO and members of executive management of the 
Association traditionally attended those parts of board meetings not explicitly related 
to issues related to management performance.  Regulation of the Association takes 
place through best practice guidelines, reinforced by regular financial reporting 
requirements, performance measurement comparisons, periodic inspections by and 
on behalf of the sector’s regulator, and through dialogue with key stakeholders 
(Mullins, 2010; Tang, 2010).  Financial and operational control is exercised through 
the business plan and the budget (Collier, 2005; Tang, 2010; TSA, 2012), reported 
by the CEO through board presentations, mission statement, core values, planned 
outcomes, key performance indicators, and sector comparisons (outlined in the 
Association’s internal and published documents).  
 
Strategic orientation at the Association was found to be the primary driver of the 
board’s exercise of control, with less emphasis on a critical review of the reporting 
system, monitoring of management, and risk management, which mirrors earlier 
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results by O’Neal and Thomas (1995), Leatherwood and O’Neal (1996), Miller 
(2002), and Peck (2005).  A mixed picture on the control orientation of the board is 
revealed as it struggled with and towards accountability.  Leading up to the crisis of 
confidence at the Association, observations of board meetings support earlier 
reviews of boards of not-for-profit organizations as mainly passive recipients of 
information who rarely rise to challenge managerial presentations (Peck, 1995).  
Board meetings were strongly dominated by the CEO and the Chairman. The CEO 
and the Chairman invariably set the board agenda and took a strong lead in directing 
the discussion, which typically yielded majority decisions in agreement with 
management.  The locus of control was initially held by the CEO, with the Chairman 
a very close second (after the crisis, this shifted permanently and decisively to the 
Chair).   
 
Observations of the board atmosphere prior to the crisis, and informal discussions 
with directors, indicate a high level of familiarity, bonding, trust, and a sense of 
common objectives among board members.  The board’s trust in the adequacy of its 
own control performance had largely been based on faith in the legitimacy of the 
formal reporting system and presentations by a trusted CEO (as one director 
expressed: “We adhere to the reporting requirements set by the regulator and follow 
sector best practice”.  – “Our CEO has been with us since the beginning and has 
weathered many storms.  He knows the sector, and we trust him”).  Nevertheless, 
informal conversations surrounding board meetings in early 2007 indicated emerging 
concerns about the Association’s formal accounts, performance and direction (post-
crisis, accounts were found by the Chair to be “inadequate, untimely, and 
incomplete”).  These concerns had, however, not been voiced during board meetings 
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until the presentation to the board in late 2007 of the findings of an external audit 
inspection on the quality of service provision revealed serious shortcomings in the 
Association’s operations (the head of the audit team referred to the Association as ‘... 
a failed housing association...’. - While the report of this routine audit inspection is in 
the public domain, referencing the document is omitted as this would conflict with the 
need to preserve confidentiality). By implication, although not by remit, the key 
findings of the audit raised immediate questions about the financial viability of the 
Association, prompting action by the board to ensure its survival as an independent 
organization.   
 
Little self-reflection on accountability of and by the board had taken place prior to 
these third party expressions of concern (one board member noted that: “There were 
some concerns in the past few years about missing or late figures, but when put to 
the CEO during informal talks before or after board meetings, these were usually met 
with promises of follow-up.  The matter was generally not pursued and not raised 
during board meetings, as it was not seen as a serious issue....we all felt that the 
Association was doing a sterling job in providing affordable housing to the 
community and that we were operating on a sound financial basis.”). Confidential 
Association data compiled in late 2007 revealed, however, that the Association’s 
financial situation had started to deteriorate from 2003 onward as a result of 
substantially increased operating costs against a near static revenue base. The 
escalation in costs was mainly due to significant increases in staff numbers and 
above sector remuneration, contrasted by relatively stagnant revenues as a result of 
a near constant level of assets under management (source: researcher’s review of 
historic internal Association data and comparison to sector data).  The divergence 
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between costs and revenues widened in the subsequent four years, and by 2007 the 
Association had been transformed from an organization with a positive cash flow and 
substantial cash reserves (prior to 2003) to one which operated at an annual loss 
with no substantial reserves (additional source: confidential Association data 
compiled in 2007/08). 
 
Ultimately, the audit verdict served to sharply focus the minds of board members, 
motivated articulation of critical issues and acted as a catalyst for a thorough and 
lengthy, but at times acrimonious, process of introspection and restructuring.  From 
end-2007 and through the whole of 2008 the board put in motion a large number of 
initiatives to change the direction of the Association and enhance the quality of its 
governance.  The incumbent CEO and the Director of Finance left the Association 
and an interim CEO (supported by an interim Director of Finance) was tasked to re-
organize the Association, implement a sound system of internal control and 
accounting, provide reliable, timely and adequate information to the board, put the 
Association on a stable financial base, address the service issues raised by the 
independent audit, and mend the strained relationships with the regulator, principal 
lenders and other stakeholders.   
 
The initial impetus for organizational change came from a small, but determined, 
minority of incumbent board members, the efforts of the interim CEO (subsequently 
made permanent), and a dedicated group of core staff.  Aspects of the restructuring 
focussed on frequent (regular and emergency) board meetings, away-days, 
meetings with various stakeholders (including the organization’s regulator and 
private sector financial institutions) and brainstorming sessions between key staff, 
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the new interim CEO, a newly created Task & Finish group, board members, and 
external advisors.  The number of regular board meetings increased from quarterly 
to monthly meetings during the 18 months of restructuring and a broad spectrum of 
meetings, which the vast majority of board members attended, took place on a near 
weekly basis, with some weeks containing several such meetings.  
 
A key ingredient to the, ultimately successful, restructuring process was the 
contribution of a small group of new board members with a housing association 
background at executive level, who joined the board at the behest of the regulator 
with a strictly time-limited (one year) remit to enhance the governance capabilities at 
the Association. During their time on the board, and against initial apprehensions by 
established members who feared an erosion of their role, the guidance of these 
directors was instrumental to efforts of the board to regain control over the 
organization.  The quality of decision-making of the board improved notably over the 
following months, with board level deliberations becoming significantly more 
informed by concerns about, and an understanding of, accountability and the 
contribution and limitations of formal accounts. By June 2009, the regulator indicated 
(through confidential communications relayed to the board in June 2009) that the 
Association had re-gained sufficient financial footing, implemented an acceptable 
internal control system, and made significant progress in addressing key service 
quality issues arising from the 2007 audit. This allowed the Association to remain 
independent and enabled a re-focus on the provision of social housing as an 
organizational core objective. 
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4. Discussion 
Neither the formal nor the informal form of accountability, on its own or in 
combination with the other, may yield meaningful board control over an organization 
(Collier, 2005).  In the course of typical boardroom discourse, important concerns 
may fail to be expressed and inadequacies of the formal form of accountability may 
remain unchallenged until critical issues of organizational performance enter the 
public domain (Parker, 2008; APB, 2012). While corporate scandals are frequently 
associated with issues of corruption, fraud, incompetence, and ethical failure of key 
governance agents, including that of members of the board (Clarke et al., 2003; 
Marnet, 2007; Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010), the bigger issue may be one of flawed 
judgment by these agents due to cognitive bias as an inescapable element of 
individual and group decision-making (Janis, 1972; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Bazerman and Watkins, 2004; Bazerman and Malhotra, 2006; Prentice, 2000, 2003; 
Coffee, 2006).   
 
Biased decisions in the boardroom are suggested to be a major contributing factor to 
what ultimately might be seen as fraudulent, imprudent or destructive behavior of 
executive management and the acquiescence (or ignorance) to such activities by a 
board (Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010). A board operates within a framework of 
dependence, social ties, loyalties, and behavioral norms which forms an environment 
that can significantly undermine a board’s monitoring function (Clarke et al., 2003; 
Coffee, 2006; Marnet, 2008).  Regardless of the competence, good faith and integrity 
of board members, subconscious cognitive processes prevent a board’s decisions 
from being unaffected by heuristics (mental shortcuts) and socialising effects, which 
can create a situation where competent individuals can passionately believe that 
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they are making a sound judgment when they are not (Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; FRC, 2011).  Biased decision-making can occur in the 
absence of direct or indirect monetary incentives and a strong argument can be 
made that parties with an interest in viewing facts in a certain light are incapable of 
independent and objective judgment (Prentice, 2000; Bazerman et al., 2002; 
Bazerman and Watkins, 2004; Moore et al., 2010). Factors known to distort 
judgment include conflicts of interest, deference to authority, peer pressure, 
emotional attachments, and inappropriate reliance on prior experience, beliefs and 
decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Kahneman et al. 1982; Jolls et al., 1998; 
Thaler, 2000; Rabin, 2002).  Bazerman et al. (2002) note a particular vulnerability of 
judgment to subconscious motivation, making, inter alia, reference to a tendency to 
excessively discount facts that contradict desirable conclusions, whilst uncritically 
embracing evidence that supports prior positions (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; 
Prentice, 2003; Coffee, 2006).   
 
An emphasis on group cohesion and unanimous decision-making, not untypical 
during boardroom interaction, can further diminish the effectiveness of a board’s 
monitoring function (Janis, 1972, 1989; Forbes and Watson, 2010).  The greater is 
group cohesion, the more prevalent are problems related to group decision-making 
(Janis, 1972, 1989). In the boardroom, this can be reflected in pressure towards 
conformity, rationalization of decisions taken, inappropriate loyalties towards a long-
serving CEO, and a reluctance to raise critical concerns (Lee et al., 2008; Forbes 
and Watson, 2010). Forbes and Watson (2010) note that organizations characterised 
by “strong managers and weak owners” (Roe, 1994) expose themselves to 
“destructive leadership” risks (Padilla et al., 2007) due to inappropriate board loyalty 
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biases, little mitigated by current corporate governance codes.  The sense of being 
in control can cause an initial reluctance by board members to grasp the magnitude 
of problems once these emerge (Bazerman and Malhotra, 2006), while dissonance 
reduction (Festinger, 1957) can further delay timely intervention by a board to avoid 
significant, and at times fatal, damage to an organization (Bazerman et al., 2002; 
Forbes and Watson, 2010). 
 
Mere exhortations to ‘be mindful of bias’ are likely to be insufficient, since individuals, 
even where they accept the presence of bias in their own judgment, are typically 
unable to sufficiently adjust for its effects without the assistance of appropriate 
decision aids (Kahneman et al. 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1987; Bazerman and 
Moore, 2008). In a governance context, the effects of bias in judgment suggests the 
need for an adoption of practices and regulations directly aimed at moderating its 
impact on the decision-making processes of boards (Bazerman and Watkins, 2004; 
Bazerman and Malhotra, 2006; Merkhofer, 2012). Such recommendations go 
beyond more traditional calls for an enhancement of board members’ expertise in, 
for example, accounting and finance, supported by formal training programs, 
induction sessions, and the periodic updating of skills (SOX, 2002; Clarke et al., 
2003; Higgs, 2003; ICSA, 2010; FRC, 2010, 2011).  Rather, initiatives aimed at de-
biasing the boardroom seek to institutionalise a reflection on the processes by which 
decisions are reached.  If successful, such initiatives can act as circuit breakers that 
may prevent flawed initial board decisions from turning into serious problems for 
organizations (Staw, 1976; Bazerman and Watkins, 2004; Balogun and Johnson, 
2005; FRC, 2011).   
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A range of practices may be employed to counter the impact of bias (Bazerman and 
Watkins, 2004; Merkhofer, 2012). A board might, for example, provide full but 
temporary membership to outsiders tasked to identify weaknesses in the quality of 
the decision-making and control processes on the board.  This can allow a board to 
change from a largely passive recipient of information (Peck, 1995) to one which 
challenges executive presentations in the discharge of responsibilities (Langevoort, 
2001a; Parker, 2008). To create an additional counterweight to a dominant senior 
manager (Lee et al., 2008), boards may wish to make greater use of a senior 
independent director to regularly discuss important decisions and proposals with 
other independent directors (FRC, 2011). Critically, boards are encouraged to adopt 
processes aimed at preventing the approval of proposals without due diligence, and 
a subsequent escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976), by, for example: Splitting the 
decision process into separate discussions on concept, proposal for discussion, and 
a proposal for decision (ICSA, 2010); commissioning independent reports; seeking 
the advice of outsiders; requiring decision makers to justify their information choices; 
appointing ‘devil’s advocates’ to seek weaknesses in a proposal; deliberately framing 
of decision problems in multiple ways; and seeking dis-confirmatory information, that 
is, to look for information and arguments that do not support a proposal (Bazerman 
and Watkins, 2004; Bazerman and Moore, 2008; FRC,2011). For significant 
decisions, a board may consider allowing a separate group of directors, not involved 
in the proposal, to assess the appropriateness of the decision process, in addition to 
assessing the merits of the proposal itself (Merkhofer, 2012). 
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Conclusion 
 
The boardroom narrative has an increasingly important role in the governance of 
quasi-public sector organizations (and elsewhere) and the main objective of this 
research is to highlight behavioral causes for a reluctance of boards to explore 
issues on which formal forms of accountability remain silent.  Cognitive bias is 
suggested to affect the control role of boards by inhibiting constructive debate and 
challenge, and by fostering an over-reliance on formal forms of accountability. This 
was observed at the Association, where the collegial, consensus-seeking 
atmosphere of board meetings, trust in the executive team, and faith in the 
competence of the Chair had first limited an adequate expression of issues critical to 
governance and accountability, and subsequently delayed the adoption of changes 
required to overcome a near fatal crisis.  The presented analysis provides support for 
an institutionalised use of procedures aimed at mitigating the effects of bias on the 
quality of board decision-making.  To allow extensions of the limited inferences that 
can be drawn by this study, further longitudinal research is encouraged to explore 
differences and similarities in the control orientation of private and not-for-profit 
sector boards.  The paper also calls for further investigation into the effects of bias 
on the control processes at board level, and on the effectiveness of procedural 
means to mitigate its impact on boardroom decisions. 
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